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An Automatically Verified Prototype of the
Tokeneer ID Station Specification
Maximiliano Cristia´ and Gianfranco Rossi
Abstract—The Tokeneer project was an initiative set forth by the National Security Agency (NSA, USA) to be used as a demonstration
that developing highly secure systems can be made by applying rigorous methods in a cost effective manner. Altran Praxis (UK) was
selected by NSA to carry out the development of the Tokeneer ID Station. The company wrote a Z specification later implemented in
the SPARK Ada programming language, which was verified using the SPARK Examiner toolset. In this paper, we show that the Z
specification can be easily and naturally encoded in the {log} set constraint language, thus generating a functional prototype.
Furthermore, we show that {log}’s automated proving capabilities can discharge all the proof obligations concerning state invariants as
well as important security properties. As a consequence, the prototype can be regarded as correct with respect to the verified
properties. This provides empirical evidence that Z users can use {log} to generate correct prototypes from their Z specifications. In
turn, these prototypes enable or simplify some verification activities discussed in the paper.
Index Terms—Tokeneer ID Station specification, Z notation, {log}, constraint programming, prototyping.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
FORMAL methods (FM) are still questioned with respectto their actual value to deliver software at a reasonable
cost. Formal methods researchers and practitioners have
proved many times that formal methods can deliver soft-
ware of unmatched quality, e.g. [1], [2]. The FM community
has also shown that high quality is not an impediment to
keep costs low when total cost of ownership and critical
systems are considered [3], [4]. However, most of the soft-
ware industry is still reluctant to apply FM, and frequently
is unaware of their possible value. Even critical software
providers do not always apply FM and are not obligated
to do so as standards do not always mandate a formal
approach, e.g. IEC 61508 Safety Integrity Level 4.
In this context the National Security Agency (NSA) of the
U.S.A. conducted a project aiming at providing evidence to
software vendors that formal techniques can deliver high
quality software in time and within budget. In particular
NSA chose the Tokeneer ID Station (TIS) which makes part
of the Tokeneer system. Tokeneer provides protection to
secure information held on a network of workstations sit-
uated in a physically secure enclave. TIS, in turn, is a stand-
alone trusted entity responsible for performing biometric
verification of the user. NSA asked Altran Praxis (then
Praxis Critical Systems) to provide an implementation of
TIS conforming to Common Criteria’s EAL5-level [5] and to
disclose to the public domain all the deliverables produced
during system development. As said, the ultimate goal of
NSA was to show that this kind of development efforts
are feasible (i.e., they achieve reliable software) and cost-
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effective (i.e., they are not more expensive than traditional
development processes) [6], [7].
Altran Praxis applied its own Correctness by Construc-
tion development process to the TIS software. The second
phase of this development process consists in writing a Z
[8], [9] formal specification of the user requirements. The
Z specification is central to the development process as
it is used as the correctness criteria for many verification
activities.
The work described in this paper starts from this Z
specification. More precisely, we first encode the Z speci-
fication in the {log} set constraint programming language
[10], [11], [12]. This provides a functional prototype of the
Z specification. We say ‘encode’ and not ‘implement’ due
to the close resemblance between the {log} language and
Z; however, the encoding provides an implementation in
the form of a prototype. In a second step, we use {log}’s
constraint solving capabilities to automatically prove that
the prototype verifies all the state invariants defined in the
Z specification as well as all but one of the security prop-
erties stated by Altran Praxis team—this amounts to dis-
charge 523 proof obligations. This constitutes a step forward
with respect to the original project as these invariants and
properties were not machine-checked by Altran Praxis at
the specification level. Besides, this implies that the {log}
program is an automatically verified functional prototype
of the Z specification. This provides empirical evidence that
Z users can use {log} to generate correct prototypes from
their Z specifications. The paper discusses some verification
activities that can be carried out or simplified once the {log}
prototype is available.
The present work aims at providing more empirical
evidence that FM-based tools such as {log} can effectively
be used in industrial projects willing to provide high quality
software without incurring in increased costs or delayed
schedules.
The paper assumes the reader has some exposure to
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Z specification—otherwise the reader can consult any Z
textbook, e.g. [9].
The paper is structured as follows. The Z specification of
the Tokeneer project is briefly introduced in Section 2, along
with the security properties the system should enforce. {log}
is presented in Section 3 by means of examples. Section 4
discusses the encoding of the Z specification in {log}. Sec-
tion 5 shows how the {log} prototype is verified by running
automated proofs of state invariants and security properties;
Section 5.3 discusses some other verification activities that
can be done with the prototype. A quantitative report of
some key aspects of this endeavor is presented in Section 6.
In Section 7 we put our results in the context of other works
that used the Tokeneer project as a case study. In Section 8
we present our conclusions.
2 THE Z SPECIFICATION OF THE TIS
The Tokeneer project carried out be Altran Praxis has been
thoroughly documented in part due to the requirements of
the Common Criteria [6], [13]. In this section we will focus
on the Z specification generated during the project. The goal
is for the reader to have an idea of the complexity and
peculiarities of the Z specification. We will not explain it
in full in part because, precisely, encoding it in {log} can be
done in a completely formal manner; understanding what
the specification is about is unnecessary.
The Z specification is a 117 pages long document con-
taining formal Z code plus informal explanatory statements
about it [14]. There is also an 11 pages long document
stating security properties the Z specification must verify
[15]. Whenever we refer to “the (Z) specification” we mean
these two documents, unless stated differently; and by “the
team” we mean the Altran Praxis development team that
worked out the specification.
The Z specification is written in a more or less standard
fashion. However, it starts by introducing two polymorphic
operators working in tandem that are somewhat unusual:
optionalX == {x : FX | #x ≤ 1}
the[X] == {x : X • {x} 7→ x}
optional is used to indicate that a variable can hold a value
or nil, as for example in:
Certificate
id : CertificateId
validityPeriod : PTIME
isValidatedBy : optionalKEYPART
meaning that the certificate can be validated by some (asym-
metric cryptographic) key or it cannot. When the key does
exist and has to be retrieved from the certificate, then the the
operator comes into play; for instance:
the cert.isValidatedBy = issuerCert.subjectPubK
Concerning the encoding of the Z specification in {log}, it is
important to note that optional can be defined as follows:
optionalX == {x : FX | x = ∅ ∨ (∃ y : X | x = {y})}
Likely, the team opted by the first definition in an attempt to
keep the number of quantified formulas as low as possible.
As we will show, introducing existentially quantified vari-
ables in {log} is harmless, while introducing the cardinality
operator is not.
Z schemas are heavily used to give structure to the
main concepts formalized in the specification. For example,
Certificate is used to define:
AttCertificate
Certificate
baseCertId : CertificateId
tokenID : TOKENID
which in turn is used to define:
PrivCert
AttCertificate
role : PRIVILEGE
clearance : Clearance
which is used to define a Token:
Token
tokenID : TOKENID
idCert : IDCert
privCert : PrivCert
iandACert : IandACert
authCert : optionalAuthCert
It can be said that the specification is divided into
two parts: the real world peripherals interacting with
the TIS and the TIS itself. The state of all real world
entities is modeled with the RealWorld schema which
is divided into two schemas, TISControlledRealWorld and
TISMonitoredRealWorld. In total RealWorld comprises 11 state
variables. In turn, the TIS state is modeled in schema
IDStation which includes 12 schemas representing different
subsystems. In total IDStation declares 36 state variables.
The definition of IDStation follows the style of most Z
specifications1:
IDStation
. . .
DoorLatchAlarm
. . .
currentDisplay : DISPLAYMESSAGE
currentScreen : Screen
status ∈ {gotFinger,waitingFinger, . . .} ⇒
((∃ValidToken • goodT(θValidToken) = . . . )
∨ (∃TokenWithValidAuth • . . . ))
. . .
currentScreen.screenStats = displayStats(θStats)
That is, it includes several schemas, declares two variables
and 8 state invariants. Note that these state invariants are
conjoined with those declared in some of the included
schemas (e.g. DoorLatchAlarm). This implies a total of 13
state invariants. The reader can see two of them in the
summary of the schema shown above. The first one gives
an idea of the complexity of some of the predicates: it is a
1. We use ellipses to shorten the presentation.
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quantified formula using Z’s θ operator. The θ operator is
one of the most complex logical operators of the Z notation.
Some of the state variables in RealWorld and IDStation
have a non-enumerated free type, as for example:
KEYBOARD ::= noKB | badKB | keyedOps〈〈. . .〉〉
which means the presence of structured infinite types.
The specification defines 25 major operations plus 3
that group some of these operations (e.g. TISUserEntryOp
specifying the complete authentication process)2. All TIS op-
erations are state transitions over RealWorld and IDStation.
Many of these operations are assembled from simpler oper-
ation schemas by means of some non-trivial schema expres-
sions; for instance:
TISArchiveLogOp =̂ StartArchiveLog ∨ . . .
StartArchiveLog =̂
(StartArchiveLogOK o9 UpdateFloppy)
∨ StartArchiveLogWaitingFloppy
∨ [BadAdminLogout | . . . ]
There is a particularly important operation schema,
namely TISProcessing, specifying the overall processing ac-
tivity of the TIS because it is used to state some important
security properties as we will see. TISProcessing “calls” 20
TIS operations and updates the audit log:
TISProcessing =̂
(· · · ∨ TISUserEntryOp ∨ · · · ∨ TISAdminOp ∨ . . . )
∧ LogChange
2.1 State Invariants
The specification follows the Z style concerning the en-
coding of state invariants. This means that state invari-
ants are declared in the predicate part of the state schema
(i.e., IDStation). Including the state invariants in the state
schema implies that all operations trivially verify them. We
exemplify this with a simple example not taken from the
specification.
State =̂ [x : Z | 0 ≤ x]
Op =̂ [∆State | x′ = x− 1]
Op cannot violate the state invariant (0 ≤ x) because the
state invariant is part of Op’ definition:
[∆State | x′ = x− 1]
≡ [x, x′ : Z | 0 ≤ x ∧ x′ = x− 1 ∧ 0 ≤ x′]
So Op cannot be called when x = 0 because Op’s predicate
implies 0 < x. This is called implicit precondition and raises
due to the interaction between the state invariant and the
operation predicate.
Another approach concerning state invariants is to prove
that each operation verifies them. In this case the state
invariant is not encoded in the state schema, preconditions
are explicitly stated and a proof obligation is introduced:
State =̂ [x : Z]
Inv =̂ [State | 0 ≤ x]
Op =̂ [∆State | 0 < x ∧ x′ = x− 1]
proof obligation Inv ∧ Op⇒ Inv′
2. These are the operation schemas whose names begin with TIS.
This second approach has the advantage that all pre-
conditions are explicit making the transition to the imple-
mentation simpler, but it has the disadvantage of having to
discharge proof obligations.
In encoding the Z specification in {log} we opted for
this second approach because we want the {log} prototype
to be closer to an implementation (than the Z specification)
and because {log} can automatically discharge these proof
obligations (see Section 5).
2.2 Security Properties
The team stated 6 security properties the specification must
verify; one of them is not formalized, so we will not consider
it. The team provided informal proofs of these properties.
According to the documentation the most important of these
properties is Property 1; we reproduce an excerpt of it here
for the reader to have an idea of its complexity:
∆IDStation; ∆RealWorld |
TISOpThenUpdate
∧ latch = locked ∧ latch′ = unlocked
⊢
(∃ValidToken • goodT(θValidToken) = . . .
∧ UserTokenOKNoCurrCheck
∧ FingerOK)
∨
(∃TokenWithValidAuth • goodT(. . . ) = . . .
∧ UserTokenWithOKAuthCertNoCurrCheck)
∨
(∃ValidToken • goodT(θValidToken) = . . .
∧ authCert 6= ∅ ∧ (the authCert).role = guard)
where:
TISOpThenUpdate =̂ TISProcessing o9 TISUpdate
That is, the property must be proved for 20 of the TIS
operations, followed by the TISUpdate operation.
It is important to remark that the above formula does
not really correspond to the property the team would have
wanted to prove—we call it the intended property. This is
acknowledged by team in the technical documentation [15,
page 11, ‘Note on arguments’]. The formula formalizing the
intended property cannot be expressed in the Z notation.
Indeed, that formula would have to predicate over (infinite)
sequences of states instead of pairs of states as stated by the
semantics of the Z notation [16], [17]. It is easy to observe
that TIS is actually a reactive system perhaps making Z not
the best notation to specify it.
We remark this point because we make an extra effort to
overcome this limitation when proving the validity of Prop-
erty 1 for the {log} prototype (see Section 5.2.1). Hence, we
end up producing not only a mechanized (automated) proof
of Property 1 but also we produce proofs of several other
properties that together provide much stronger arguments
that the intended property actually holds.
3 THE {log} CONSTRAINT SOLVER
{log} is a public available satisfiability solver and a
set-based, constraint-based programming language imple-
mented in Prolog [12]. {log} implements a decision pro-
cedure for the theory of hereditarily finite sets, i.e., finitely
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nested sets that are finite at each level of nesting [10]; a deci-
sion procedure for a very expressive fragment of the class of
finite set relation algebras [11], [18]; a decision procedure for
restricted intensional sets (RIS) [19], [20]; and uses Prolog’s
CLP(Q) to provide a decision procedure for integer linear
arithmetic [21]. In {log} sets and binary relations are first-
class entities of the language. At the core of these decision
procedures is set unification [22]. The set terms defined
in all these three decision procedures can be combined in
several ways: binary relations are hereditarily finite sets
whose elements are ordered pairs and so set operators can
take binary relations as arguments; RIS can be passed as
arguments to set operators and freely combined with exten-
sional sets. {log} is an untyped formalism; variables are not
declared; typing information can be encoded by means of
constraints. Several in-depth empirical evaluations provide
evidence that {log} is able to solve non-trivial problems
[11], [18], [19], [20], [23], in particular as an automated
verifier of security properties [24]. Given that {log} has
been extensively described elsewhere, in this section we will
show a few examples for the reader to understand how it
works.
In {log} set operators are encoded as constraints. For
example: un(A,B,C) is a constraint interpreted as C = A∪B.
{log} implements a wide range of set and relational opera-
tors covering most of those used in Z. For instance, in is
a constraint interpreted as set membership (i.e., ∈); = is set
equality; dom(F,D) corresponds to dom F = D; subset(A,B)
corresponds to A ⊆ B; comp(R, S,T) is interpreted as
T = R o9 S (i.e., relational composition); and apply(F,X,Y)
is equivalent to pfun(F) & [X,Y] in F, where pfun(F)
constrains F to be a (partial) function. Formulas in {log} are
conjunctions (&) and disjunctions (or) of constraints; they
must finish with a dot (as a Prolog query). Negation in {log}
is introduced by means of so-called negated constraints. For
example nun(A,B,C) is interpreted as C 6= A ∪ B and nin
corresponds to /∈—in general, a constraint beginning with
‘n’ identifies a negated constraint. For formulas to lay inside
the decision procedures implemented in {log}, users must
only use this form of negation.
The fact that set operators take a relational rather than a
functional form makes it necessary to introduce variables to
write compound expressions.
Example 1. The Z expression x ∈ A ∩ B ∩ C is encoded as
X inM & inters(A,B,W) & inters(W,C,M).
Set terms can be of the following forms:
• A variable is a set term; variable names must start
with an uppercase letter.
• {} is the term interpreted as the empty set.
• {x/A} is called extensional set and is interpreted as
{x} ∪ A; A must be a set term, x can be any term ac-
cepted by {log} (basically, any Prolog uninterpreted
symbol, integers, lists, ordered pairs, etc.).
• ris(X in A, φ) is called restricted intensional set (RIS)
and is interpreted as {x : x ∈ A ∧ φ} where φ is any
{log} formula; Amust be a set term and X is a bound
variable local to the RIS. Actually, RIS have a more
complex and expressive structure [19], [20].
Being a satisfiability solver, {log} can be used as an auto-
mated theorem prover. To prove that formula φ is a theorem,
{log} has to be called to prove that ¬ φ is unsatisfiable.
Example 2. We can prove that set union is commutative by
asking {log} to prove the following is unsatisfiable:
un(A,B,C) & un(B,A,D) & C neq D.
As there are no sets satisfying this formula {log} answers
no. Note that the formula can also be written with the
nun constraint: un(A,B,C) & nun(B,A,C).
{log} is also a programming language at the intersection
of declarative programming, set programming [25] and
constraint programming. {log} programs can be structured
by means of clauses—as in Prolog. A clause can be seen
as a subroutine or procedure. Clauses can receive zero or
more arguments. The only way a clause can return a value
is by means of one or more of its arguments. Under certain
conditions clauses behave as formulas. That is a {log} clause
can be seen as both a program and a formula. The following
examples show the formula-program duality of {log} code
along with the notion of clause.
Example 3. If we want a program that updates function F
in X with value Y provided X belongs to the domain of
F and get an error otherwise, the {log} code can be the
following:
update(F,X,Y, F ,Error) :-
F = {[X,V]/F1} & [X,V] nin F1 &
F = {[X,Y]/F1} &
Error = ok
or
comp({[X,X]}, F, {}) &
Error = err.
That is, update is a clause that receives F, X and Y and
returns the modified F in F and the error code in Error—
think of F as the value of F in the next state. As &
and or are logical connectives and = is logical equality,
the order of the ‘instructions’ is irrelevant w.r.t. the
functional result—although it can have an impact on the
performance. Variable F1 is an existentially quantified
variable representing the ‘rest’ of F w.r.t. to [X,V]. If
[X,V] does not belong to F then the unification between F
and {[X,V]/F1} will fail thus making update to execute
the other branch.
Nowwe can call update by providing inputs andwaiting
for outputs:
update({[setlog, 5], [hello, earth], [tokeneer,model]},
hello,world,G,E).
returns:
G = {[hello,world], [setlog, 5], [tokeneer,model]}
E = ok
Since update is also a formula we can prove properties
true of it.
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Example 4. If Error is equal to err then X does not belong to
the domain of F. In order to prove this property we need
to call {log} on its negation:
update(F,X,Y, F , err) & dom(F,D) & X inD.
Then, {log} answers no because the formula is unsatisfi-
able.
As Example 3 shows, variables introduced in the clause
body (e.g. F1) are existentially quantified variables. This
is important because of the way existentially quantified
formulas of the Z specification are encoded in {log}.
{log} implements set unification but syntactic Prolog
unification is still available as part of it. Prolog unification
comes handy to encode some Z features and predicates.
Example 5. The ‘dot’ notation used in Z to access compo-
nents of ordered pairs and variables of schema types, can
be encoded by means of Prolog unification. For instance
if x : A×B, then the Z expression: h = x.1 can be encoded
as X = [X1,X2] & H = X1 or even as X = [H,X2].
Further, since X2 seems to be uninteresting yet another
encoding is X = [H, ].
Example 6. A more elaborated example is the encoding of
the Z predicate x ∈ dom f as [X, ]inF. Indeed, [X, ]inF is
readily rewritten as F = {[X, ]/F1} which is interpreted
as ‘there is a pair in Fwhose first component is X’, which
in turn means that X belongs to the domain of F. A
more direct encoding is dom(F,D) & X in D but it
requires to compute the domain while the first encoding
does not, meaning that the first encoding will, in general,
yield more efficient {log} code. Yet another encoding is
ncomp({[X,X]}, F, {})which uses the negated constraint
of the comp constraint. That is, ncomp({[X,X]}, F, {}) is
equivalent to comp({[X,X]}, F, F1) & F1 neq {}, which
is a fourth encoding.
As can be seen, frequently, unification introduces exis-
tentially quantified variables. In many circumstances these
quantified formulas can be dealt with in a decidable manner
[10], [11], [18], [19], [20]. A key aspect to preserve decidabil-
ity is not to use logical negation but the negated constraints
provided by {log}.
Example 7. Concerning formula x ∈ dom f of Example 6, the
encoding of its negation, x 6∈ dom f , in {log} cannot be
done simply with a formula such as ∀Y : [X,Y] nin F
because this formula is outside the set of admissible
{log} formulas. Conversely, the decidable way to handle
this negation is either: dom(F,D) & X nin D; or
comp({[X,X]}, F, {}).
The last example opens the issue of universal quanti-
fiers in {log}. In {log} universally quantified formulas are
provided by mean of RIS. In effect, the introduction of
RIS in {log} allows for the definition of restricted universal
quantifiers (RUQ). In general, if A is a set, then a RUQ is a
formula of the following form:
∀ x ∈ A : φ
It is easy to prove the following:
(∀ x ∈ A : φ)⇔ A ⊆ {x : x ∈ A ∧ φ} (1)
Given that {x : x ∈ A ∧ φ} is the interpretation of ris(X in
A, φ), the r.h.s. of (1) can be expressed as the {log} formula:
subset(A, ris(X in A, φ))
In {log} we have defined the foreach constraint to make
RUQ easier to write:
foreach(X in A, φ) :- subset(A, ris(X in A, φ)).
We use these features to encode the Z specification
in {log}, to automatically prove invariance lemmas and
properties, and to provide a correct prototype of the Z
specification in the form of a {log} program.
4 ENCODING THE TIS SPECIFICATION IN {log}
In the introduction, we say ‘encoding’ and not ‘imple-
menting’ the TIS specification due to the close resemblance
between the Z and {log} languages. That is, our point is that
writing {log} code from the specification is considerably
more natural, evident and semantically equivalent than
writing, say, SPARK code. Then, it looks like more as an
encoding than as an implementation. In particular, {log}
implements all the logical, set and relational operators used
in the TIS specification. Furthermore, these operators are
not mere imperative implementations but real executable
mathematical definitions. That is, they behave as logical or
mathematical objects, as we have shown in Section 3. In
other words, the {log} prototype is a formula quite as the
TIS specification is. We say ‘quite’ because of two reasons:
• The {log} code can be used to compute results. Then,
{log} programmers may pay attention to implemen-
tation issues, such as efficiency.
• For different programming reasons (e.g. use of Pro-
log and set unification) we introduce some modifica-
tions in the {log} code w.r.t. the specification.
This takes the discussion to another issue: the {log} code is a
prototype and not a program. Hence, users cannot expect the
same computing efficiency from the {log} code than from a
typical imperative implementation. For instance, engineers
can use the prototype to analyze functional scenarios but
they cannot draw efficiency estimations. This section will
make these points clear.
The {log} encoding of the TIS specification as well
as all the proof obligations can be found online:
http://people.dmi.unipr.it/gianfranco.rossi/SETLOG/
APPLICATIONS/tokeneer.zip.
In general, each Z schema is encoded as a {log} clause.
The variables declared in the schema become arguments
of the clause. In many cases, if the schema declares vari-
ables through schema inclusion then the arguments of the
clause are those schemas instead of the variables declared
inside them. This somewhat preserves the structure of the
specification. Schemas whose predicate part is empty are
encoded as tuples of variables. We preserved the identifiers
used in the specification as much as possible in the {log}
code. Recall that {log} variables (constants) must start with
an uppercase (lowercase) letter; while clauses can start only
with a lowercase letter. Next state variables (e.g. x′) are
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encoded as {log} variables decorated with an underscore
(e.g. X )3.
Figures 1 and 2 show parts of the encoding. In Figure
1 the specification is at the left and the corresponding
encoding in {log}, at the right. We attempted to align each
row of the specification with the corresponding row in {log}.
In Figure 2 the specification is at the top and the encoding at
the bottom. In general, the encoding in {log} is longer than
the corresponding Z code, as is expected for any lower-level
representation, but not that much (see Section 6).
Consider Figure 1. As can be seen, schema CurrentToken
is encoded as clause currentToken. CurrentToken declares
several variables through the inclusion of schema ValidToken
which in turns declares those variables through the inclu-
sion of schema Token. Then, in this case currentToken
has two arguments: Token, corresponding to schema Token;
and Now, corresponding to variable now. In order to make
Token a valid one, validToken(Token) is conjoined.
As expected, validToken is the encoding of schema
ValidToken (not shown). In the specification TIME is a syn-
onym for N, so Now is constrained to be a non-negative
integer by asserting 0 =< Now. Given that Token is a
schema declaring five variables it is encoded as a 5-tuple:
Token = [_,IDC,PC,IAC,_] where the correspondence
between Z and {log} variables is implemented by decla-
ration order. Thus, PC corresponds to the third variable
declared in Token, i.e., privCert. In currentToken only IDC,
PC and IAC play some role, so the other two are hidden by
putting underscores in their positions. The named variables
can have any name because they are existentially quantified
inside the clause. Besides, Token = [_,IDC,PC,IAC,_]
forces the unification of the actual argument to be a 5-tuple;
in case this is not true the clause will fail. The specifica-
tion variables corresponding to IDC, PC and IAC are of
schema types (e.g. privCert : PrivCert, see Section 2), so they
are encoded as tuples, e.g. PC = [_,PVP,_,_,_,_,_].
In this particular case PVP corresponds to the Z expres-
sion privCert.validityPeriod (recall Example 5). Therefore, the
predicate stated in CurrentToken is encoded as shown in
Example 1.
Still in Figure 1, UserTokenOK’s predicate is based on a
quantified schema expression using the θ operator. The type
of currentUserToken is:
TOKENTRY ::= noT | badT | goodT〈〈Token〉〉
Then, currentUserToken ∈ ran goodT means that the current
user token is indeed a Token. That is, the predicate is
equivalent to ∃ t : Token • currentUserToken = goodT(t).
Avoiding quantified formulas is important but the encoding
can introduce an existentially quantified variable without
getting into troubles: CurrentUserToken = goodT(_).
Along the same lines, the predicate (∃CurrentToken •
. . . ) is easily encoded with currentToken(Token,Now);
that is, by asserting the existence of variables Token
and Now satisfying currentToken. Then, θValidToken
refers to the Token asserted in (∃CurrentToken • . . . ).
So, goodT(Token) = CurrentUserToken is asserted in
{log}. This implies that goodT(_) = goodT(Token), thus
3. The prime symbol is not allowed as part of a variable name in
Prolog+{log}.
making CurrentUserToken = goodT(_) superfluous—
actually, we included it to make the encoding more simi-
lar to the specification. Finally, the last three existentially
quantified predicates are encoded along the same lines.
That is, the encoding of schema CertOK is called on each
certificate contained in the Token. Note that, for instance,
(∃ IDCert . . . ) corresponds to variable IDC; thus θIDCert =
idCert corresponds to IDC = [[Id,VP,IVB],[_,_]];
and [Id,VP,IVB] is the Certificate passed in as argument
to certOK.
Now consider Figure 2. Schema BioCheckRequired spec-
ifies part of the ValidateUserTokenOK operation which
in turn is part of the TISValidateUserToken operation.
BioCheckRequiredmakes a ‘delta’ on IDStation and RealWorld;
this is hidden in schema UserEntryContext. This is reflected
in the encoding as clause bioCheckRequired waits for
IDStation and IDStation_, meaning that the clause
transitions from the former to the latter. As explained in
Section 2, IDStation includes 12 schemas and declares two
variables. Then, the encoding for IDStation is a 14-tuple
respecting the declaration order given in the specification.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the invariants stated inside
IDStation are moved out of it; see Section 5 for further
details. Note that IDStation′ is encoded as IDStation_.
As BioCheckRequired states ΞUserToken the encoding
forces UserToken and UserToken_ to be the first ele-
ments of IDStation and IDStation_, respectively, while
UserToken_ = UserToken is conjoined to the clause.
AddElementsToLog is an operation schema making a
‘delta‘ on the auditing subsystem, AudiLog, and accessing
the configuration subsystem, Config. In {log} this schema
corresponds to clause addElementsToLog. The clause is
called inside a delay predicate for efficiency reasons. After
the first proof obligations were discharged it was evident
that addElementsToLog was taking too long while not
contributing to the proofs. Hence, we ask {log} to delay its
execution as much as possible.AddElementsToLog’s predicate
starts by asserting the existence of a finite set of audit
records, newElements. The {log} encoding reflects that fact
by declaring variable _NewElements inside the clause and
passing it to addElementsToLog. This simplifies the en-
coding of some tricky parts of the specification.
In BioCheckRequired, status is a variable declared in
schema Internal (which is one of the 12 schemas included
in IDStation). The encoding uses unification to access the
corresponding variable, Status. Indeed, unification forces
Internal to be the 12th component of IDStation and it
is used again to force Status to be the first component of
Internal. Then, we can state Status = gotUserToken.
Note how the change of state of status is encoded by assert-
ing Status_ = waitingFinger.
The predicate ¬ UserTokenWithOKAuthCert is encoded
by calling the negation of userTokenWithOK AuthCert.
As explained in Section 3 (see Example 7), in or-
der to preserve decidability (general) logical negation
should not be used. Instead, the negation has to be
written in terms of {log} constraints. Given that Fig-
ure 1 includes the encoding of UserTokenOK, Figure 3
shows the encoding of ¬ UserTokenOK (in place of
¬ UserTokenWithOKAuthCert, which is nonetheless similar).
There are several reasons for which the user token is not
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CurrentToken
ValidToken
now : TIME
now ∈ idCert.validityPeriod
∩ privCert.validityPeriod
∩ iandACert.validityPeriod
UserTokenOK
KeyStore
UserToken
currentTime : TIME
currentUserToken ∈ ran goodT
∃CurrentToken •
(goodT(θValidToken) = currentUserToken
∧ now = currentTime
∧ (∃ IDCert • θIDCert = idCert ∧ CertOK)
∧ (∃ PrivCert • θPrivCert = privCert ∧ CertOK)
∧ (∃ IandACert •
θIandACert = iandACert ∧ CertOK))
currentToken(Token,Now) :-
Token = [_,IDC,PC,IAC,_] &
IDC = [[_,VP,_],[_,_]] &
PC = [_,PVP,_,_,_,_,_] &
IAC = [_,IVP,_,_,_,_] &
validToken(Token) &
0 =< Now &
Now in M2 &
inters(VP,PVP,M1) &
inters(M1,IVP,M2).
userTokenOK(
KeyStore,
UserToken,CurrentTime,Now) :-
0 =< CurrentTime &
UserToken = [CurrentUserToken,_] &
CurrentUserToken = goodT(_) &
currentToken(Token,Now) &
Token = [_,IDC,PC,IAC,_] &
IDC = [[Id,VP,IVB],[_,_]] &
PC = [PCId,PCVP,PCIVB,_,_,_,_] &
IAC = [IAId,IAVP,IAIVB,_,_,_] &
goodT(Token) = CurrentUserToken &
Now = CurrentTime &
certOK(KeyStore,[Id,VP,IVB]) &
certOK(KeyStore,[PCId,PCVP,PCIVB]) &
certOK(KeyStore,[IAId,IAVP,IAIVB]).
Fig. 1. Comparison between Z code and {log} code (part 1). Similarities are not only syntactic but semantic as well.
OK. The first one occurs when the current user token
does not belong to the range of goodT. This implies that
it must be either noT or badT (see TOKENTRY above).
The encoding is CurrentUserToken in {noT, badT}.
The other cases occur when there is a token : Token
such that currentUserToken = goodT(token). In this
case, (token, now) might not conform a current to-
ken (not_currentToken(Token,Now)); or now might
not coincide with currentTime (Now neq CurrentTime);
or any of the certificates stored in token is not OK
(not_certOK(KeyStore,[_,_,_])).
To close this section, note that the {log} encoding of
ValidateUserTokenOK turns out to be quite ’natural’ (both,
syntactically and semantically). This encoding becomes sort
of a pattern by means of which most of the Z specification
is encoded. Considering the size and complexity of the TIS
Z specification, it can be argued that {log} can be used as
an effecitive prototyping/programming language to encode
many other Z specifications.
4.1 Potential Problems with the Encoding
In spite of the similarities between Z and {log}, in passing
from the specification to the prototype several changes were
introduced. We claim that, still, the prototype is a faithful
representation of the specification as it is possible to prove
that the former verifies essential properties of the latter—
see Section 5. However, some of the changes might cause
troubles when proving new properties. In this section we
give a brief account of these differences.
Types are not always encoded. Z is a typed formalism, {log}
is not. Typing information can be encoded using set mem-
bership and constraints such as pfun. We encoded the typ-
ing information needed to prove the properties discussed
in Section 5. Some typing information is given as state
invariants—as is nonetheless the case when, for instance,
a set is implemented as a list. The encoding assumes the
Z specification has been type-checked. Then, the encoding
needs to check only the types of input values and the initial
state. It would be possible to provide a type-checker for
{log} programs based on special-purpose typing constraints.
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BioCheckRequired
UserEntryContext
ΞUserToken
ΞDoorLatchAlarm
ΞStats
AddElementsToLog
status = gotUserToken
userTokenPresence = present
¬ UserTokenWithOKAuthCert ∧ UserTokenOK
currentDisplay′ = insertFinger
status′ = waitingFinger
ValidateUserTokenOK =̂ BioCheckRequired ∨ BioCheckNotRequired
bioCheckRequired(IDStation,RealWorld,RealWorld_,IDStation_) :-
IDStation = [UserToken,_,_,DoorLatchAlarm,_,_,Config,Stats,
KeyStore,_,AuditLog,Internal,_,CurrentScreen] &
UserToken = [_,UserTokenPresence] & DoorLatchAlarm = [CurrentTime,_,_,_,_,_] &
Internal = [Status,_,_] & CurrentScreen = [ScreenStats,_,ScreenConfig] &
RealWorld = [_,TISMonitoredRealWorld] &
TISMonitoredRealWorld = [Now,_,_,_,_,_,_] &
IDStation_ = [UserToken_,_,_,DoorLatchAlarm_,_,_,_,Stats_,
_,_,AuditLog_,Internal_,CurrentDisplay_,CurrentScreen_] &
Internal_ = [Status_,_,_] & CurrentScreen_ = [ScreenStats_,_,ScreenConfig_] &
userEntryContext(IDStation,RealWorld,RealWorld_,IDStation_) &
UserToken_ = UserToken &
DoorLatchAlarm_ = DoorLatchAlarm &
Stats_ = Stats &
delay(addElementsToLog(Config,_NewElements,AuditLog,AuditLog_),false) &
Status = gotUserToken &
UserTokenPresence = present &
delay(not_userTokenWithOKAuthCert(KeyStore,UserToken,CurrentTime),false) &
userTokenOK(KeyStore,UserToken,CurrentTime,Now) &
CurrentDisplay_ = insertFinger &
Status_ = waitingFinger &
ScreenStats_ = ScreenStats &
ScreenConfig_ = ScreenConfig.
validateUserTokenOK(IDStation,RealWorld,RealWorld_,IDStation_) :-
bioCheckRequired(IDStation,RealWorld,RealWorld_,IDStation_)
or
bioCheckNotRequired(IDStation,RealWorld,RealWorld_,IDStation_).
Fig. 2. Comparison between Z code and {log} code (part 2). Similarities are not only syntactic but semantic as well.
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not_userTokenOK(KeyStore,UserToken,
CurrentTime,Now) :-
UserToken = [CurrentUserToken,_] &
(CurrentUserToken in {noT, badT}
or
CurrentUserToken = goodT(Token) &
Token = [_,IDC,PC,IAC,_] &
IDC = [[Id,VP,IVB],[_,_]] &
PC = [PCId,PCVP,PCIVB,_,_,_,_] &
IAC = [IAId,IAVP,IAIVB,_,_,_] &
(not_currentToken(Token,Now)
or
Now neq CurrentTime
or
not_certOK(KeyStore,[Id,VP,IVB])
or
not_certOK(KeyStore,[PCId,PCVP,PCIVB])
or
not_certOK(KeyStore,[IAId,IAVP,IAIVB])
)
).
Fig. 3. Encoding of ¬ UserTokenOK
Elements beyond {log}’s expressiveness. There are a few ele-
ments in the specification that are beyond the expressiveness
of {log}. Schema types cannot be encoded as sets of records.
In this particular specification this feature is used only once
and can be circumvented. Free types declaring non-constant
elements (e.g. TOKENTRY above) cannot be encoded as sets.
However, it is possible to assert that a variable is of that type
(e.g. userTokenOK and not_userTokenOK), and that all
the elements of a set are of that type by means of the foreach
constraint; not needed in this specification. {log} cannot
express N nor Z. It can express that a variable belongs to
them and that all the elements of a set belong to them (this
is used to encode the type of sizeElement). For this reason,
we cannot encode the type of authPeriod and some values
given in InitConfig. It is doubtful how these values can be
implemented in any programming language as they entail
to store a Cartesian product where one of the sets is N.
Predicate outside the decision procedure. The universally
quantified predicate in schema ValidEnrol (not included for
brevity) lays outside the decision procedures implemented
in {log}—and evidence suggests that this is a fundamental
problem [11], [26]. The problem is that the property asserted
for all elements in issuerCerts depends on issuerCerts itself.
In other words, for each element in issuerCerts there must
exist another element in it fulfilling a certain property.
This creates a sort of recursive definition. However, the
predicate can be encoded and it can be used for running the
prototype. Problems could arise if {log} is asked to decide
the satisfiability of a formula involving it, when issuerCerts
remains variable. In that case {log} might enter an infinite
loop. This is apparently not the case for the set of properties
considered in the Tokeneer project.
Computationally hard predicate. The predicate
oldElements ∪ auditLog′ = auditLog ∪ newElements in
schema AddElementsToLog is computationally very hard
when all the operands remain variable. We were able to
circumvent this issue by enclosing its encoding inside a
delay predicate.
As the empirical data shows (Section 5), these issues do
not threaten the chances of using {log} as a verification tool
for industrial-strength Z specifications.
5 A VERIFIED PROTOTYPE
Now that we have the {log} program, we can use {log}
to prove properties of it. We automatically prove two kinds
of properties: invariance lemmas and security properties. In
any case, recall that {log} can prove a theorem by proving
that its negation is unsatisfiable. If the theorem is of the
form p ⇒ q, then one should ask {log} to check if p ∧ ¬ q is
unsatisfiable. In doing so consider that: a) the negation in ¬ q
should be encoded as indicated in Sections 3 and 4; and b) if
p ∧ ¬ q happens to be satisfiable, {log} will produce a finite
representation of all the possible solutions (countermodels
or counterexamples). This last feature comes handy to find
out what are the possible causes for the formula not to be a
theorem.
Section 6 provides quantitative figures about the verifi-
cation work carried out with {log}.
5.1 Invariance Lemmas
As explained in Section 2.1, we move the state invariants
included in schema IDStation out of it; this includes all the
state invariants written in the schemas included in IDStation.
In doing so, we must: a) add pre- or post-conditions to some
operations; and b) prove that each TIS operation preserves
each invariant.
Concerning a), for instance, the encoding of UnlockDoor
is augmented with the following conditions:
unlockDoor(DoorLatchAlarm,Config,
DoorLatchAlarm_) :-
......
(LatchUnlockDuration neq 0 &
CurrentLatch_ = unlocked &
DoorAlarm_ = silent
or
LatchUnlockDuration = 0 &
CurrentLatch_ = locked &
(AlarmSilentDuration neq 0 &
DoorAlarm_ = silent
or
AlarmSilentDuration = 0 &
(CurrentDoor = open &
DoorAlarm_ = alarming
or
CurrentDoor = closed &
DoorAlarm_ = silent
)
)
).
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for TISUnlockDoor to preserve the invariant stated in schema
DoorLatchAlarm:
currentLatch = locked⇔ currentTime ≥ latchTimeout
doorAlarm = alarming⇔
(currentDoor = open
∧ currentLatch = locked
∧ currentTime ≥ alarmTimeout)
Note that the encoding of the invariant is closer to an
implementation based on conditional statements than the
Z invariant and that it takes into account other predicates
included in UnlockDoor like latchTimeout′ = currentTime +
latchUnlockDuration. This would help in passing from the
{log} prototype to a definitive implementation.
Concerning b), for each TIS operation we discharge a
proof obligation of the form:
Invariant ∧ TISOperation ⇒ Invariant′
encoded as:
invariant(IDStation) &
tisOperation(IDStation,RealWorld,
RealWorld_, IDStation_) &
not_invariant(IDStation_).
where not_invariant is the {log} negation of
invariant.
Example 8. The state invariant included in IDStation:
enclaveStatus
/∈ { notEnrolled,waitingEnrol,waitingEndEnrol }
⇒ ownName 6= nil
is encoded as:
idStationInv07(IDStation) :-
IDStation =
[...,KeyStore,...,Internal,...] &
KeyStore = [_,OwnName] &
Internal = [_,EnclaveStatus,_] &
(EnclaveStatus in {notEnrolled,
waitingEnrol,
waitingEndEnrol}
or
OwnName neq {}
).
while its negation is:
not_idStationInv07(IDStation) :-
IDStation =
[...,KeyStore,...,Internal,...] &
KeyStore = [_,OwnName] &
Internal = [_,EnclaveStatus,_] &
EnclaveStatus nin {notEnrolled,
waitingEnrol,
waitingEndEnrol} &
OwnName = {}.
5.2 Security Properties
All security properties formalized by the team—i.e., Prop-
erty 1-4 and 6—are encoded in {log}. However, Property
2 cannot be proved by {log} because it requires a decision
procedure for integer intervals—which is, in fact, part of our
current work. Properties 3, 4 and 6 are proved as formalized
by the team. For instance, the encoding of Property 3 is the
following4:
property3 :-
idStationInv01(IDStation) &
(tisEarlyUpdate(IDStation,RealWorld,
RealWorld_,IDStation_)
or
tisUpdate(IDStation,RealWorld,
RealWorld_,IDStation_)
) &
......
Latch_ = locked &
CurrentDoor_ = open &
CurrentTime_ >= AlarmTimeout &
Alarm_ neq alarming.
5.2.1 Proving Property 1
As we have explained in Section 2.2, the formalization of
Property 1 given by the team does not actually capture the
intended property. This is acknowledged by the team in the
technical documentation. The intended property requires to
consider different execution sequences of the TIS operations.
Each of these sequences takes the system from the initial
state to a state where the property holds. The point made by
the team is that the system can follow only those sequences.
Therefore, we make one more step by proving that the
system can only execute those state sequences. Once the
system arrives at the desired state, we prove that Property 1
holds. Hence, the proof of Property 1 involves (automat-
ically) discharging 16 proof obligations—11 to prove the
system can only execute certain state changes; 4 to prove
that some properties hold at some of the traversed states;
and 1 to prove Property 1. This proof strategy follows the
informal proof made by the team [15, Section 3.2.1, pages
8-10].
Before giving details on the encoding of these proofs,
it should be noted that in doing them we have to add
enclaveStatus 6= waitingStartAdminOp as an hypothesis to
many of the auxiliary lemmas—otherwise they do not hold.
This is so because, without that hypothesis, TISShutdownOp
can be executed violating some desired properties. To the
best of our knowledge, this extra hypothesis and the prob-
lems with TISShutdownOp are not mentioned in the docu-
mentation. Maybe this is obvious for the team and so they
omitted it in the documentation.
Figures 4 and 5 depict the state sequences that lead the
system to the state where Property 1 holds. Figure 6 shows
the encoding of a lemma stating that if the system ever
reaches status = gotUserToken it is because the before state
was status = quiescent—i.e., the first transition of Figure 4.
4. The ellipsis replace the unification between IDStation and the
other arguments with tuples to have access to the variables.
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That is, the {log} code corresponds to the negation of the
following formula:
∆IDStation; ∆RealWorld |
TISOpThenUpdate
∧ enclaveStatus 6= waitingStartAdminOp
∧ status′ = gotUserToken ∧ status′ 6= status
⊢
status = quiescent
where TISOpThenUpdate is the composition between the
disjunction of all the TIS operations and the TISUpdate
operation [15, page 5].
We prove one such lemma for each transition shown
in Figures 4 and 5. In this way, the {log} prototype is
guaranteed to follow only those state sequences when it
comes to the validity of Property 1.
Next, we prove that when the system reaches some of the
states depicted in Figures 4 and 5 some properties hold. For
example, when passing from gotUserToken to waitingEntry,
the user token is checked for validity and the presence in
the token of an authorization certificate is checked as well.
Figure 7 shows the encoding of this lemma. As can be
seen, we need pfun(IssuerKey_) as an hypothesis. In Z
terms, this means that issuerKey′ is a partial function, which
is the type given to the variable in the specification. This
hypothesis is proved to be a state invariant and so it can be
assumed without loss of generality.
Finally, Property 1 itself is proved by assuming the
properties shown to be valid in the intermediate states.
Having discharged all the proof obligations concerning
state invariants and those concerning security properties,
the {log} prototype is correct w.r.t. them. Therefore, it can
be used as a correct implementation of the specification, at
least on what concerns to the proven properties.
5.3 The Prototype as a Verification Tool
The prototype can be used as an analysis tool taking advan-
tage of its correctness. The most natural activity is to use it
as an implementation to evaluate how the system behaves
in specific functional scenarios.
Example 9. We may want to analyze different scenarios
when the enclave’s door is unlocked by asking {log} to
execute the following:
DLA = [5,locked,_,_,_,_] &
C = [10,4,_,_,_,_,_,_] &
doorLatchAlarmInv(DLA) & configInv(C,100) &
unlockDoor(DLA,C,DLA_).
where part of the first solution is:
DLA_ = [5,locked,unlocked,silent,9,19]
Observe that we give the before state (e.g. DLA), check
whether it satisfies the invariants, and then run
unlockDoor waiting for the next state (DLA_). Besides,
note that the before state is only partially given (cf. the
underscores in DLA) which allows to analyze several
scenarios in one run.
Being able to execute these scenarios in the presence of
the customer can help to “check that this vital step [Z
specification] has been achieved correctly” without needing
a person “with full knowledge of the problem domain and
a fluent reading knowledge of Z” [6]— the latter being not
easy to find.
A more elaborated activity would be to use the {log}
prototype as part of a model-based testing method, e.g. [27],
[28], [29]. Let’s call P{log} and PSPARK the {log} prototype and
the SPARK implementation corresponding to the Z specifi-
cation, respectively. Given a test case generated from the
specification, run it on both P{log} and PSPARK and compare
the outputs generated by each of them to decide whether
or not the test case has uncovered an error in PSPARK. The
output generated by P{log} should be deemed correct as
the prototype verifies all the stated properties. Hence, if the
output generated by PSPARK does not coincide it should be
concluded that there is an error in it. Furthermore, {log}
itself can be used as a test case generator in the context of Z
specifications [23].
Along the same line, P{log} can be used as a runtime
or reference monitor of PSPARK. Reference monitors have
been proposed as a way to control the execution of secure
systems, e.g. [30], [31]. In this scenario, P{log} and PSPARK
execute in parallel in such a way that every input sent
to PSPARK is also sent to P{log}. If the outputs differ an
alarm is fired. Clearly, the control is ex post (due to the,
possibly sensible, different execution speeds) but in some
circumstances this is much better than nothing. For example,
in case a malfunction in PSPARK allows an unauthorized
access to the enclave, the late alarm fired by P{log} would
allow for security personnel to correct the situation before is
too late.
The intention behind these proposals and the mere fact
of using {log} is to show that {log} can be useful, and not
that it should replace existing tools or techniques used in
development processes such as Altran Praxis’ Correct by
Construction. {log} can fill some gaps when it comes to pro-
totyping, automated proof and counterexample generation
in the context of set-based specifications.
6 QUANTITATIVE REPORT
Besides proving all the lemmas described in Sections 5.1 and
5.2 we prove that:
1) Every disjunct of all the TIS operations is satisfiable.
This verification is important because, as operations
act in the antecedent of lemmas, if they are unsatisfi-
able then the lemma holds trivially. See for example
Property 1 in Section 2.2.
2) The initial state satisfies all the state invariants.
This is a standard verification step when state in-
variants are involved.
3) The conjunction of the negation of a schema and the
schema itself is unsatisfiable, while those schemas
are independently satisfiable.
This applies only to those schemas whose negation
appears either in the specification or as part of a
lemma. These proofs are done to gain confidence in
that each negation has been correctly written.
Table 1 summarizes key quantitative measures about
the effort involved during this work. The first measured
magnitude is effort (man-hours). It is difficult and can be
misleading to estimate the effort needed to conduct the
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quiescent
gotUserToken waitingFinger gotFinger waitingUpdateToken waitingEntry
waitingRemoveTokenSuccesswaitingEntry
waitingRemoveTokenFail
Fig. 4. Sequences of state changes leading to status = waitingRemoveTokenSuccess
enclaveQuiescent, ∅ gotAdminToken, ∅ enclaveQuiescent, 6= ∅ waitingStartAdminOp, 6= ∅
Fig. 5. Sequences of state changes leading to enclaveStatus = waitingStartAdminOp, rolePresent 6= ∅
property1_01 :-
IDStation = [_,_,_,DoorLatchAlarm,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,Internal,_,_] &
Internal = [Status,EnclaveStatus,_] &
EnclaveStatus = enclaveQuiescent &
Status neq quiescent &
tisOpThenUpdate(M,IDStation,RealWorld,RealWorld_,IDStation_) &
IDStation_ = [_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,Internal_,_,_] &
Internal_ = [Status_,_,_] &
Status neq Status_ & Status_ = gotUserToken.
Fig. 6. Encoding of a state change lemma
property1_09 :-
IDStation = [_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,Internal,_,_] &
Internal = [Status,EnclaveStatus,_] &
Status = gotUserToken & EnclaveStatus = enclaveQuiescent &
tisOpThenUpdate(M,IDStation,RealWorld,RealWorld_,IDStation_) &
IDStation_ = [UserToken_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,KeyStore_,_,_,Internal_,_,_] &
UserToken_ = [CurrentUserToken_,_] &
Internal_ = [Status_,_,_] &
Status_ = waitingEntry &
(not_tokenWithValidAuth(CurrentUserToken_)
or
KeyStore_ = [IssuerKey_,_] &
pfun(IssuerKey_) &
not_userTokenWithOKAuthCertNoCurrencyCheck(KeyStore_,UserToken_,_)
).
Fig. 7. Encoding of a lemma stating an intermediate property
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work carried out with {log} because it was done on an
academic environment rather than a corporate one. Nev-
ertheless, we think that an approximate number could help
others. Our effort estimate for encoding the Z specification
and discharging all the 523 proof obligations is between
40 and 120 man-hour. It depends on the experience of
the engineer with Z, {log}, proof strategies and automated
proof. Note that the effort reported by the team to write the
Z specification and conduct informal proofs is 233.5 man-
hour [7, Appendix B, page 71, item 3000]. A more elaborated
tool environment could further reduce our estimate.
The next measuredmagnitude is size. As can be seen, the
{log} prototype is around 30% larger than the Z specification
measured in lines of code (LOC), but it is more than the
double in terms of kilobytes. This is consistent with the
fact that any implementation is expected to be more ver-
bose than the specification. This verbosity can be observed
in Figures 1 and 2. The {log} code for proof obligations
(lemmas) is considerably larger than the prototype, but it
means less than 10 LOC per lemma and it contains pretty-
printing predicates to simplify proof execution. Much of the
proof obligations code can be automatically generated—we
did so with a few simple bash scripts but in an industrial
environment it can be done much better.
The last aspect wemeasure concerns the number of proof
obligations (523) and the time {log} spends in discharging
them (851 seconds). As can be seen, most of the proof
obligations corresponds to invariance lemmas as well as
the computing time to discharge them (548 seconds). Most
of the time is spent in proving the invariance of three TIS
operations (TISEnrolOp, TISValidateUserToken and TISPoll).
In average, each proof obligation runs in 1.6 seconds. There
are at least two possible ways to reduce the computing
time: parallelization and what we call proof programming. In
effect, every lemma can be discharged independently of the
others and so each of them can be run in a different thread.
Prolog provides high-level parallelization predicates (e.g.
concurrent/4) that can be easily used to considerably
reduce the computing time.
Proof programming refers to the application of some
{log} control predicates (e.g. delay) to impose some or-
der in the execution of constraints. As we have shown in
Section 5, enclosing a constraint in a delay predicate can
speed up the execution of the prototype. However, if the
delayed constraint is important to discharge a particular
proof obligation the proof will take longer compared to a
goal where that constraint is not delayed. Hence, the best
strategy is to delay a constraint for a proof while not to
delay it for another. This requires some proof programming.
In general proof programming has to be applied only to
some constraints. It is an area that deserves to be further
explored.
The numbers reported in Table 1 provide evidence about
the usefulness of {log} as a verification tool for Z specifica-
tions.
6.1 Platform where the verification was executed
The verification of the {log} prototype of the TIS specifi-
cation was performed on a Latitude E7470 (06DC) with a
4 core Intel(R) CoreTM i7-6600U CPU at 2.60GHz with 8
Gb of main memory, running Linux Ubuntu 18.04.4 (LTS)
64-bit with kernel 4.15.0-106-generic. {log} 4.9.6-21c over
SWI-Prolog (multi-threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4) was used
during the experiments.
The execution time of each collection of proof obligations
is given by T in the following {log} formula:
prolog_call(get_time(Ti)) &
<collection proof obligations>
prolog_call(get_time(Te)) &
prolog_call(T is Te - Ti).
where prolog_call is a {log} facility to access the Prolog
interpreter.
The {log} code used in this work can be down-
loaded from http://people.dmi.unipr.it/gianfranco.rossi/
SETLOG/APPLICATIONS/tokeneer.zip along with instruc-
tions to set up the environment.
7 OTHER WORKS ABOUT THE TOKENEER
PROJECT
Besides members of the team in charge of the Tokeneer
project, other researchers have used it as a case study, a
benchmark or just as an industrial-scale problem. We will
comment on the most relevant ones w.r.t. our work.
Rivera et al. [32] undertake the Tokeneer project in
Event-B. They use the Rodin toolset for discharging proof
obligations and the EventB2Java code generator to create
a Java program from the Event-B model. The TIS model
consists of an abstract machine and 6 refinements. The full
development resulted in 334 proof obligations, of which
more than 90% are discharged automatically using Rodin.
These proof obligations should coincide with a subset of
those proved with {log}. Rivera and his colleagues prove
Properties 1, 2 and 3 with Rodin, although it is not clear
whether or not they are automatically discharged. As can
be seen, {log} is able to automatically discharge 100% of the
proof obligations. Besides, {log} produces a prototype while
the Event-B approach needs to apply EventB2Java. Likely,
the resulting Java program will be more efficient than the
{log} prototype, but the former is only a program while the
latter is a program and a formula. Although it is not exactly
the same, there is a sort of Java version of {log} called JSetL
[33], [34].
Answer Set Programming, which is close to constraint
programming, has been used to generate counterexamples
for false and unprovable verification conditions (VC) of the
Tokeneer project [35]. These VC correspond to those gener-
ated during the verification of the SPARK implementation.
As we have shown, {log} returns a finite representation of
all the solutions of any satisfiable formula. These solutions
are counterexamples when the intention is to discharge a
VC—that is, the VC is negated, submitted to {log} and it
returns a solution (counterexample) meaning that the VC is
not a theorem. Along the same lines, in a technical report,
Jackson and Passmore apply an SMT solving-based tool to
prove SPARK VC of the Tokeneer project [36]. The tool calls
CVC 3, Yices, Z3 and Simplify. Roughly, the tool proves
more than 90% of the VC. Tokeneer has also been used as
a case study for the formal verification framework Echo
[37]. Echo uses PVS as a theorem prover and SPARK as
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TABLE 1
Summary of Quantitative Report
EFFORT
From 40 to 120 man-hour (prototype + proofs)
SIZE
KLOC KBYTE
Z (LATEX) 2 52
PROTOTYPE ({log}) 2.6 108
LEMMAS ({log}) 5.1 276
PROOF OBLIGATIONS (LEMMAS)
COLLECTION NUMBER TIME (S)
NEGATIONS 93 4
INVARIANCE 325 533
TISEnrolOp 107
TISValidateUserToken 114
TISPoll 281
SATISFIABILITY OF INITIAL STATE 12 0.1
SATISFIABILITY OF OPERATIONS 74 0.9
SECURITY PROPERTIES 19 313
TOTALS 523 851
programming language. According to the paper “in 90%
of the cases, the PVS theorem prover could not prove the
implication lemmas completely automatically”.
Although, the VC are at the SPARK level and the proof
obligations discharged by {log} and Rodin (cf. Rivera et
al. above) are at the specification level, there should be a
clear relation between them as the SPARK program should
implement the specification. Hence, {log} looks promising
as a VC verifier.
Abdelhalim et al. [38] apply CSP to formalize fUML ac-
tivity diagrams and FDR as a model checker to the Tokeneer
specification. Specifically the authors found several dead-
lock scenarios in the form of counterexamples generated by
FDR.
The work authored by Moy and Wallenburg [39] is in-
teresting because they find problems in Tokeneer, although
it was formally verified. Moy and Wallenburg’s goal is to
find out why these problems were not found when the
system was verified and to propose verification activities
that could have detected these problems. Specifically, the au-
thors propose to complement formal verification with static
analysis and code reviews. {log}might be considered as part
of the toolbox proposed by Moy and Wallenburg as it is
at the intersection of several programming and verification
paradigms. For instance, it can be used to perform proofs
and to run functional scenarios.
Woodcock at al. [29] apply an assertion-guided model-
based robustness testing method to the Tokeneer project.
Robustness testing checks that a system can handle unex-
pected user input or software failures. They use a model of
the system for code generation (the Z original specification)
and a separate model for test case generation (an Alloy
model); these models are independently produced from the
requirements. The test case specifications are fed into the
Alloy Analyzer, and test cases are automatically generated
as counterexamples. This allowed the authors to detect nine
anomalous behaviors. {log} can be used in place of Alloy
and its analyzer. In fact the Alloy Analyzer does not imple-
ment a decision procedure for sets and binary relations, as
the one provided by {log}. Then, the Alloy Analyzer might
fail in finding a counterexample while {log} might not.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We have encoded the Z specification of the Tokeneer project
in {log}. This encoding can be used as a functional pro-
totype. Then, we used {log} to automatically proved hun-
dreds of proof obligations over the prototype itself. That
is, we took advantage of the formula-program duality of
{log} code to produce a verified prototype w.r.t. the proven
properties. In this way, {log} is used as a programming
language and a verification engine using the same and
only representation of the system. The case study provides
evidence that {log} can be helpful in analyzing set-based
formal specifications like those written in the Z formal
notation.
The most interesting future work is to apply {log} to
discharge the verification conditions generated during the
verification of the SPARK implementation.
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